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Clarke 2 
It is an arresting quality of our present day and age that, for all our epistemological advances and 
our conquests in the fields of science and technology, questions like “Who am I?” and “What am 
I doing?” are perhaps more than ever tremendously difficult to answer. For example, in the 2003 
film Lost in Translation, Scarlett Johansson’s character—Charlotte—knows neither what she is 
doing nor what she wants to be. “What do you do?” her fellow protagonist asks. “I’m not sure 
yet, actually,” she responds, adding, “I just graduated last spring.” And, in a later scene, she 
admits, “I’m just not sure what I’m supposed to be.”1 All of this is simply to iterate what T.S. 
Eliot said eighty years earlier in The Waste Land: “Son of man, / You cannot say, or guess, for 
you know only / A heap of broken images.”2 
But the example from Lost in Translation brings a certain point to our attention about the 
strangeness of this modern ignorance. Charlotte studied philosophy. Now, it is not the intention 
of this essay to ponder and then pass judgment on the kinds of philosophy Charlotte might have 
studied, and in what ways those particular kinds of philosophy might have resulted in her sense 
of uncertainty, lack of purpose, and a self-consciousness that is intensely introspective. The idea 
of a “perennial philosophy,” with which the essay will engage at a later point, suggests that the 
solution to the modern severance from the truth is a change in what is studied. But this essay 
intends to explore the ways in which the question of “what” Charlotte studied might in fact be 
secondary to the question of “how” she, as a modern self, actually studied. For Charlotte, as what 
one critic of the film called “a lost soul”3, is indicative of a problem peculiar to the modern self, 
a problem that has effectively compromised its ability to “do” philosophy. In other words, there 
is something holding back or holding down the modern self from engaging fully and properly in 
                                                     
1Lost in Translation, directed by Sofia Coppola, (2003; Universal City, CA: Universal Studios, 2010), DVD. 
2T.S. Eliot, The Wasteland, in Collected Poems, 1909–1962 (New York: Harcourt, 1991), ll. 20–22.  
3Roger Ebert, review of Lost in Translation (12 September 2003), accessed on 1 May 2015, 
http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/lost-in-translation-2003.  
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the pursuit of wisdom. But what is this vague and sinister “something”? In his discussion of the 
natural law, Thomas Aquinas identified “evil persuasions” and “vicious customs and corrupt 
habits” as the two ways in which the natural law can be “blotted out from the human heart.”4 The 
reason, then, why Charlotte and so many others can study philosophy and yet still be lost in the 
cosmos is not solely because their schools saturated them with Descartes and Derrida, and not 
Dionysius and Duns Scotus, nor indeed because these students themselves have studied Sartre 
and Schopenhauer, rather than sitting at the feet of the masterful Socrates and St. Thomas.  
Instead, it is because even sans the direct study of those philosophies, modern selves are 
products of a culture and a history that have been directed and shaped by those philosophies. As 
one American scholar argued at the midpoint of the twentieth century: “The defeat of logical 
realism in the great medieval debate was the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from 
this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence.”5 After five hundred years of anti-
logical realism, however, are we in fact capable, without intense and intentional rehabilitation, of 
returning to logical realism and all that it entails? Proponents of philosophia perennis might 
answer in the affirmative, since true philosophy is unchanging as truth itself is immutable. But 
the praxis of philosophy, for better or worse, does change; we are intellectually susceptible, as 
the teaching of Thomas Aquinas said, to “evil persuasions” and “corrupt habits.” Undoing the 
effects of those persuasions and habits requires that we confront what is the central problem, 
both intellectually and existentially, of modernity: the self and its relation to the world.  
Modernity, in stark contrast to the Middle Ages and even Greek antiquity, is unabashedly 
egocentric and anthropocentric. No longer does our conception of the cosmos breed humility or 
encourage attention to the transcendent; modern men, as Descartes asserted, are born to be “the 
                                                     
4Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger 
Bros, 1947), I-II.94.6.  
5Richard Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 3.  
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masters and possessors of nature.”6 But our self-awareness in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, even if it is described with the same language of autonomy as used in Descartes, is not 
experienced in its autonomy with the same confidence and comprehension as is present in that 
passage from the Meditations. Quite to the contrary, autonomy is presently experienced as rife 
with dis-ease and a lack of understanding: “Maybe when you’re older you will understand / Why 
you don't feel right /Why you can't sleep at night now / In line for a number but you don’t 
understand / Like a modern man.”7 And in many ways, this dis-ease and ignorance is the result 
of the unconscious philosophical positions we take in the face of reality; unconscious because the 
way we think is “simply the way we think,” and we do not ourselves understand how our mode 
of thinking came to exist in the way it does. It is this foundation of unconscious presuppositions 
that is at the heart of Christian Smith’s foray into the minds and hearts of modern selves, Souls in 
Transition.  
In philosophical terms, most emerging adults functionally (meaning how they 
actually think and act, regardless of the theories they hold) are soft ontological 
antirealists and epistemological skeptics and perspectivalists—although few have 
any conscious idea what those terms mean. They seem to presuppose that they are 
simply imprisoned in their own subjective selves, limited to their biased 
interpretations of their sense perceptions, unable to know the real truth of anything 
beyond themselves.8 
An additional reference to Eliot is relevant here: “What are the roots that clutch, what branches 
grow / Out of this stony rubbish?”9 The answer: we are really not sure what underlies or 
motivates our actions or our being; we just live and move and exist in particular times and places 
without reference to the past or real knowledge of the present—we are “unable to know the truth 
                                                     
6Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and First Meditations, trans. Donald Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1998), 34. 
7Arcade Fire, “Modern Man,” in The Suburbs, Merge Records, 2010.  
8Christian Smith, Souls in Transition: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of Emerging Adults (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 45. 
9Eliot, The Wasteland, ll. 19–20. 
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of anything beyond” ourselves. In a very mundane and quotidian fashion, the modern world “is 
too much with us” for us to know it, ourselves, and what lies in the great beyond. 
Given the state of affairs described up to this point, what are we to make of the 
philosophical act in particular and of philosophy in general? Not only does philosophy in the 
modern age, of its own accord, seem powerless to grant salvation—be that salvation 
characterized as the “good life” here and now or as a Platonic contemplation of the Forms—but 
philosophy seems also to have lost its position as handmaiden to the divine, and thus is incapable 
of even orienting us toward what truly brings salvation and truth. For believer and non-believer 
alike, the question is a live one. Does philosophy, with all the baggage of the early-, late-, and 
post-modern periods, still matter as it once did in Athens and Paris? Clearly it does, as otherwise 
this present essay would be a vain work indeed. But for believers, to whom the Lord says, “I am 
the way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:16) and “Without me, you can do nothing” (John 15:5), 
the temptation to succumb to fideism is quite real. But Catholic tradition denies the viability of a 
fideistic approach to reality; reason is indeed a gift from God and has an essential part to play in 
the life of faith.10 For believers, then, philosophy does matter. Now the question becomes: with 
what kind of philosophy should we concern ourselves? 
One possible path already mentioned, namely that of “perennial philosophy,” deserves 
some attention. Perennial philosophy has been defined as “a tradition of classical wisdom 
originating in Plato and Aristotle, subject to healthy Christian influences in the age of the Fathers 
of the Church, culminating in the scholastic period (with figures such as Bonaventure, Aquinas, 
and Scotus in particular).”11 The first mark of perennial philosophy, then, is that it proposes a 
                                                     
10Cf. Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, para. 55: “Fideism fails to recognize the importance of rational knowledge 
and philosophical discourse for the understanding of faith, indeed for the very possibility of belief in God.” 
11Thomas Joseph White, OP, “Why Should Christians Study Philosophy?”, in Nova et Vetera, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2012), 
15. 
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clear and defined body of work as its foundation—it offers a distinctive “what” to be studied. 
Even the most cursory of examinations of this body of work will reveal that the central focus of 
perennial philosophy is being. Immediately, this separates perennial philosophy from the kind of 
philosophy that is familiar to moderns—“Abandoning the investigation of being, modern 
philosophical research has concentrated instead upon human knowing.”12 One scholar has 
pointed out that, for Thomas Aquinas, the assertion that knowing is primary and philosophy thus 
ought to “begin with an epistemology” is an erroneous one, in light of the fact that “the human 
spirit finds itself already oriented to being and truth.”13 The primacy of being requires that 
perennial philosophy be “commanded by a metaphysic.”14 
The primacy of being is the fundamental tenet of classical and scholastic philosophy, 
since nothing is known that does not first have being. As one Thomistic scholar puts it, “Because 
being attends all our representations, every true philosophy must be a philosophy of being.”15 
That is to say, if we are going to arrive at the truths of human experience, we must attend first 
and foremost to first truths—to the reality of the first things. This observation should bring to 
light an essential characteristic of perennial philosophy, namely, that it is not withdrawn from the 
world and closed in on itself: “Now the end of philosophy is not for us to have learned 
philosophy. Just as physics is not about physics, but about nature, so also philosophy is not about 
philosophy but about reality understood in the light of philosophical principles.”16 (Hence why 
the retreat of philosophia perennis and the advance of modern philosophy occur coincidentally 
                                                     
12Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, para. 5.  
13Aidan Nichols, OP, Discovering Aquinas: An Introduction to His Life, Work, and Influence (Grand Rapids: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), 159.  
14Ibid., 149.  
15Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Thomism (New York: P.J. Kenedy & Sons, 1964), 88.  
16Ibid., 93; emphasis added. 
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with Descartes meditating in the cozy confines of his quarters: for it is there and then that 
philosophy begins to break away from being.) 
The breaking away from being necessitates a retreat from metaphysical realism. What 
does this mean? Quite simply, that the stance of the human person to the world is radically 
transformed; no longer is the world and the ways of its constituent parts a fixed and definitive 
reality, independent of the varying and individualized impressions and perceptions of human 
consciousness. The departure from metaphysical realism means that no more philosophy is 
fundamentally concerned with “coming to terms with what is first not in our consciousness but in 
the order of reality, whether that be matter, the demiurge, pure chance, a world-soul, or the 
transcendent God.”17 With the realistic foundation and the subject of being thus removed, 
philosophy has little option but to turn inwards on the one who philosophizes, on the self. The 
result: the egocentric nature of modern philosophy and the pervasive primacy of subjectivity. 
The call for a return to a perennial philosophy proposes that the healing for this philosophical 
disarray is to turn matters on their heads, and thus re-orient philosophy toward being. For the 
human intellect itself is in fact oriented toward being and capable of knowing it. This Thomistic 
viewpoint rather does away with the Kantian conception of the relationship between intellect and 
reality that we have inherited: “Thomas is not Kant—who thought that whatever shape we find 
the world to have is one the human mind itself confers upon it. At the back of our minds is a 
sunburst in which even the most opaque objects can stand forth for what they really are.”18 The 
ability of the intellect to represent rather than determine the truth of reality prevents the one who 
thinks and acts from experiencing—at least in regards to being—isolation, skepticism, and that 
perspectivalism mentioned by Smith. Thus, even before the formulation of the Cartesian cogito, 
                                                     
17White, “Philosophy?”, 19.  
18Nichols, Discovering Aquinas, 160. 
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individuals possessed certain knowledge of their actual existence by virtue of metaphysical 
realism. Ultimately, the promise of the perennial philosophy, as exemplified in the Thomistic 
tradition, is that its riches provide us with the means necessary to “build up conclusions around 
some solid idea of what natures are, what human persons are, what the soul is, what we can 
know (or not know) of God, and so forth.”19 
But to this notion that has been laid out in the preceding section, concerning the perennial 
philosophy and its constitutive concepts, there are two objections that demand consideration. 
These two objections, the “contextual-conditional” and the “post-modern,” which are directly 
formulated and responded to in an essay already referenced, are permeated with the habitual 
irresolution and dis-ease that is peculiar to modern thought. The notion of a perennial philosophy 
is not a viable one, asserts the contextual-conditional objection, because “Our thought, our 
philosophy, even our very beings are historically conditioned, such that we are meshed with 
other persons relationally in culturally situated contexts outside of which we become 
unintelligible.”20 Therefore, the assertion that a particular philosophical system, which achieved 
a certain manner of success at one point in history, is capable of achieving the same or similar 
success at a later point in history overlooks an essential quality of history: namely, that it is a 
temporal process and as such involves contingency and change. The consequences of change and 
contingency condition us to be and behave in a certain way. Even ontological realism must 
acknowledge that, permanence contends with impermanence in reality; human nature can always 
and everywhere be human nature, but human behavior and human practice do in fact undergo 
changes.  
                                                     
19White, “Philosophy?”, 22. 
20Ibid., 16.  
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What sense are we to make of this? The cultural-conditional objection suggests that we 
“adopt most fundamentally a narrative vision of reality. Experience and phenomenological 
description, not intellectual systems, should be accorded primacy of place.”21 But this suggestion 
stems from an extreme of the cultural-conditional view, which itself is an extension of the 
“narrative vision of reality.”22 A more tempered suggestion from the narrative viewpoint might 
not demand that historical and phenomenological data be given “primary of place,” but instead 
propose that such data in fact does play a crucial and necessary role in philosophy, in the pursuit 
of truth and wisdom, especially at our present time. For, as one philosopher and devotee of 
Charles Taylor recently argued, understanding the present necessitates taking the tasking trek 
through the past: “If we’re going to make sense of our muddled present, we need to get close to 
the ground and explore all kinds of contingent twists and turns that are operative in the 
background of our present.”23 For if the words of the Common Doctor are taken as true, that 
“evil persuasions” can obfuscate the capacity of the human person to know and love what is true 
and good, and the deviations in Western philosophy from metaphysical realism and other tenets 
of philosophia perennis have in fact been evil persuasions, then it is certainly crucial that we 
examine the past in order to see properly where and how philosophy went wrong. This 
exploration of the past is necessary for an additional reason: that the sins of our philosophical 
forefathers have been visited on even those children who have determined to be faithful lovers of 
philosophia perennis. For most, if not all, of us seem to bear the marks of defeat from that 
bygone medieval debate. 
In addition to “evil persuasions,” Thomas Aquinas also speaks of “corrupt habits” as one 
of the ways that the natural law is blotted out in human practice. We can become so accustomed 
                                                     
21Ibid. 
22Ibid.  
23James K.A. Smith, How (Not) to Be Secular (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014), 25.  
Clarke 10 
to particular persuasion that is contrary to the true and good that we are rendered unaware of its 
presence, never mind its malevolence. If this holds true for philosophy, and it seems that in its 
present state (especially in our universities) of fragmentation and discord and irrelevance 
(consider the relegation of metaphysics to the corner of bookstores where tarot and palm-reading 
guides are kept), it indeed does hold true. Thus, one might well ask: what are these philosophical 
habits and how did we come to possess them, however unwittingly or unintentionally, come to 
possess them in the twenty-first century?  
If we penetrate what Husserl called “the crust of the externalized ‘historical facts’ of 
philosophical history”24, we find that the shift in focus from being to the ego at the dawn of the 
Enlightenment remains in effect in the problem of modernity. Modern thought is concerned with 
the self, with personhood, in a way that medieval philosophy was not. Cogito ergo sum: this is 
the root formulation of modern thought, and we have not yet managed to sever ourselves from it. 
In the absence of a strong metaphysical foundation, we are left to understand how we are part of 
a physical world at the same that we sense ourselves to be radically different from its other parts. 
This leads to a thread of self-definition. Freud wrote of how, in the face of reality, man “can try 
to re-create it, try to build up another instead, from which the most unbearable features are 
eliminated and replaced by others corresponding to one’s own wishes.”25 Something similar to 
this is found in Husserl, who spoke of the struggle for self-truth: “This true being is not 
something he always already has, with the evidence of the ‘I am,’ but something he only has and 
can have in the form of the struggle for his truth, the struggle to make himself true.”26 One gets a 
taste for how these assertions have made their mark on worldviews and ways of thinking, 
                                                     
24Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to 
Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 18.  
25Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. Joan Riviere (Eastford: Martino Publishing, 2011), 36. 
26Husserl, Crisis, 13.  
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considering that the danger of modernity is “to become no one nowhere”27 and the postmodern 
presumption that individuals “are autonomous agents who have to deal with each other, yes, but 
do so entirely as self-directing choosers.”28 
This is the problem with which perennial philosophy must contend, if it is to be a 
harbinger of truth and light to modern man: the problem of self. The meeting of a system that is 
objective in its metaphysics and employs a representative epistemology with the modern system 
of subjectivity, skepticism, self-definition will result, at least initially, in conflict rather than 
conversion. The evil persuasions and corrupt habits with which we have been left at this point in 
philosophical history will not go away without a fight; we are, in varying degrees, “natural 
Cartesians” (self-centered). Does this mean, then, that these two different systems are in fact 
ultimately incompatible? Such is assertion of the “post-modern” objection, which is worth 
considering in its entirety.  
No one human articulation of meaning is necessarily binding on the human intellect. 
Man is not only a factory of idols, but also an endless forger of intellectual systems, 
and the metaphysics he formulates are pluralistic, and mutually exclusive in their 
incompatibility. Tertullian asked “what has Athens to do with Jerusalem,” but we 
can also ask, what has “Athens to do with Königsberg, or the Sorbonne to do with 
Cambridge.” Philosophies endlessly and inevitably refute philosophies, and there is 
no common ground from which to adjudicate what is true philosophically from a 
supposedly grounded first perspective.29 
Now, in light of what has been discussed about the fundamental difference between 
classical and modern philosophies, one can readily see that the problem is not the absence of an 
actual principle by which truth can be arrived, but a conflict between two divergent principles: 
being and self. The reason that Tertullian’s question has remained relevant through the ages is 
that philosophies do clash and there does arise incompatibility. In this the post-modern objection 
                                                     
27Walker Percy, The Moviegoer (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 83.  
28Smith, Souls in Transition, 49; emphasis added.  
29White, “Philosophy?”,17. 
Clarke 12 
is correct, but the inference it makes, to the effect that philosophical conflict is “endless,” is 
contentious. One response to this is an affirmation of the realism found in perennial philosophy 
as the resolution of the crisis: “In the face of realistic philosophical arguments, the ills of post-
modernist perspectivalism, the lassitude of indifferentism, and the smugness of anti-
supernaturalism can all be seen themselves to be forms of unrealistic thinking.”30 Certainly, there 
is merit to this proposal; the truths themselves of philosophia perennis are in no way brought into 
question in this discussion. What is, however, subject to debate is the receptivity of the modern 
mind to the realistic philosophical arguments. To what extent is the modern mind, saturated as it 
is with misbegotten and misdirected persuasions, capable—without some manner or 
rehabilitation—of understanding and assenting to the truths of classical and scholastic thought?  
Not to belabor the point, but the fundamental “mis-persuasion,” so to speak, of modernity 
is the abandonment of being in favor of focusing on human reason. This abandonment of being 
embeds in modernity a tendency toward nihilism. This was the primary thrust of an essay by 
theologian David Bentley Hart, in which he described how, in Heideggerian thought, nihilism is 
“born in a forgetfulness of the mystery of being, and in the attempt to capture and master being 
in artifacts of reason.”31In the course of that essay, Hart charted the progression of Western 
thought, describing how Christianity absorbed all that was good in ancient and pagan thought; 
naught remained of the pagan tradition “but a few grim, gaunt ruins to lure back the occasional 
disenchanted Christian and shelter a few atavistic ghosts”: for “the Christian God has taken up 
everything into Himself; all the treasures of ancient wisdom, all the splendor of creation, every 
good thing.”32 As a result, Hart argued, we are left with the state of affairs found in Western 
modernity: “The only cult that can truly thrive in the aftermath of Christianity is a sordid service 
                                                     
30Ibid., 20.  
31David Bentley Hart, “Christ and Nothing,” in First Things 136 (October 2003), 49. 
32Ibid., 52; 53. 
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of the self, of the impulses of the will, of the nothingness that is all that the withdrawal of 
Christianity leaves behind.”33 And that is precisely the cult that has been described at length in 
this discussion.  
Does Christianity, then, provide the means and material for repairing and rehabilitating 
the modern mind? Is Christianity itself to be our primary means of ascending to truth—be it 
natural or supernatural? An answer in the affirmative seems out of keeping with what has already 
been said regarding the stance of Catholicism toward fideism, but there is room for nuance and 
qualification. Rather than formulating the discussion in such a way as to examine the 
compatibility of faith with reason, or vice versa, a more fruitful approach (for our present 
interest) is to examine faith itself. For the faith-reason debate can itself fall prey to the malaise of 
modern thought; at present, discussions of the compatibility, relationship, and relative merits, to 
mention a few angles of interest, of faith and reason flow from methodologies and terminologies 
which are, to borrow Husserl’s term, “sedimented” with the persuasions, customs, and habits that 
have become part of the Western ethos since a certain point in history, namely, the 
Enlightenment.34 Enlightenment philosophy, as then-Cardinal Ratzinger pointed out, is 
“incomplete” because “it detaches itself from what we might call the basic memory of mankind, 
without which reason loses its orientation.”35 The recovery of this memory—a task on which 
perennial philosophy professes to focus—rests on a restored vision of faith. As the present Holy 
Father wrote in his first encyclical: “There is an urgent need, then, to see once again that faith is 
                                                     
33Ibid., 54.  
34The notion that modernity begins in the Enlightenment has been touched upon already, in particular with reference 
to the Cartesian cogito and to the demise of logical realism at (or as?) the end of the Middle Ages (see reference to 
Weaver, n. 5). The notion may correspond most directly, as Smith suggests, to the epistemological inclinations of 
the West, which have trickled down to effect everything from metaphysics to ethics, and from education to 
aesthetics. Smith writes: “Philosophical accounts of modernity—and hence our present (or “postmodernity”)—tend 
to have an epistemological fixation that seizes upon the Enlightenment as the center of the story” (Secular, 73–74). 
This essay insists that the epistemological transformation is central to the discussion of the role of faith in curing the 
malaise of modern thought.  
35Joseph Ratzinger, Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 41.  
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a light, for once the flame of faith dies out, all other lights begin to dim. The light of faith is 
unique, since it is capable of illuminating every aspect of human existence.”36 The power of faith 
to illuminate and explain the entirety of reality bridges the divide between classical and modern 
thought. Whereas classical thought focuses on being while modern thought is centered on the 
self, faith provides the foundation to pursue the truth of each.  
Faith provides this foundation first in its relational dimension, which makes the 
metaphysical realism of the classical and scholastic schools accessible to the self-occupied 
modern mind by explaining existence as personal. In other words, faith establishes existence as 
personal—as giving each individual a meaningful place and purpose—in a way that even the 
metaphysics of realism cannot. Taking again from the Holy Father, Abraham (“our father in 
faith”) “does not see God, but hears his voice. Faith thus takes on a personal aspect. God is not 
the god of a particular place, or a deity linked to specific sacred time, but the God of a person.”37 
Faith, in a single sweeping movement, re-orients us to truth and meaning. Ultimately, the “God 
of a person” is Christ himself: hence, “Those who believe, see; they see with a light that 
illumines their entire journey, for it comes from the risen Christ, the morning star which never 
sets.”38  
This yields the second way in which faith provides the foundation for truth: the purifying 
power of faith as light is able to divest philosophical thought of its “evil persuasions.” So 
encrusted is modern thought with these persuasions that, without the illuminating power of faith, 
it is difficult to imagine a return to truth. In the bold and unflinching words of Hart: “Modern 
persons will never find rest for their restless hearts without Christ, for modern culture is nothing 
but the wasteland from which the gods have departed, and so this restlessness has become its 
                                                     
36Pope Francis, Lumen Fidei, para. 4.  
37Ibid., para. 8.  
38Ibid., para. 1.  
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own deity; and, deprived of the shelter of the sacred and the consoling myths of sacrifice, the 
modern person must wander or drift.”39 Certainly, if we take seriously the malaise of modern 
thought and the manifold ways in which philosophical history has left us to attempt to encounter 
the truth and attain meaning with broken tools and distorted concepts, then we will also take 
seriously Hart’s disjunction between choosing faith in Christ and choosing the wasteland of self-
obsession. White made a remarkable insight about the relationship between knower and known, 
to the effect that truth of a claim does not depend on the philosophical sophistication of its 
proposal.40 Instead, as classical thought would have it, truth exists external to the mind; the mind 
represents the truth to the knower. The knower enters into a relationship with the truth, because 
the truth is not identical to the knower. Hence, the conformity of the classical traditional with the 
relational nature of faith: existence is personal, because truth is personal. Our arrival at the 
truth—with which philosophy in its sincerest form is concerned—rests, then, on getting outside 
of ourselves (that peculiarly modern occupation) and encountering that truth. And what provides 
this foundation but faith? For “faith is born of an encounter with the living God who calls us and 
reveals his love.”41 And that is the nature and promise of the light of faith: to purify us in 
preparation for knowing the truth. 
  
                                                     
39Hart, “Christ,” 55.  
40See White, “Philosophy?”, 24.  
41Pope Francis, Lumen Fidei, para. 4.  
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